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Photograph of newly nominated Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie during a
trip to Maine. e senator of 22 years was nominated by President Jimmy
Carter to replace Cyrus Vance who resigned. Collections of the Maine Historical Society.

WAS THE “S” FOR SILENT?:
THE MAINE INDIAN LAND CLAIMS
AND SENATOR EDMUND S. MUSKIE
BY JOSEPH HALL
This article explores the work of one of Maine’s most powerful politicians, U.S. Senator Edmund Muskie, during one of Maine’s most difficult political crises, the Maine Indian Land Claims of the s. In ,
when Penobscots and Passamaquoddies challenged the legality of land
sales conducted from  to , they called into question the legal title
of the northern two-thirds of the State of Maine. Tom Tureen, the lawyer
for the tribes, and Governor James Longley and State Attorney General
Joseph Brennan, the state officials leading the case for Maine, played
central roles in the case. Muskie played a crucial, if less important, role
by advocating for a negotiated settlement that prevented a protracted legal fight. Muskie’s more limited involvement was rooted, in part, in his
preference to be a negotiator rather than an advocate in this particular
case, but it also was a product of his lack of experience with Maine Indian issues. Muskie’s restraint had important consequences for the case,
because it allowed more vocally anti-Indian state leaders like Longley
and Brennan to shape the rhetoric that would define the controversy
long after the case was settled in . Joseph Hall is an Associate Professor of History at Bates College, where he teaches and studies Native
American history and early American history.

O

n February 10, 1978, Maine’s senior U.S. Senator, Edmund S.
Muskie came to Augusta to speak before a joint session of the
state legislature about what he called “the Indian problem,” or
“the Indian land claim controversy.” For more than two years, the State
of Maine had been confronted with a lawsuit that threatened to return
12.5 million acres to Penobscots and Passamaquoddies who lived in the
eastern part of the state. At a time when the national economy was itself
suﬀering from recession and inflation, the suit placed the economic
foundations of two-thirds of the state suddenly in limbo, if not in jeopardy. Muskie made this unusual visit to Augusta—in fact, only four days
aer a blizzard had paralyzed the Northeast—because negotiators for
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the Carter administration and the tribes had just two days earlier released a joint memorandum outlining a proposed settlement. But what
was supposed to settle a controversy seemed instead to make it more
tempestuous: Far from considering the proposals a start to negotiations,
some Passamaquoddy negotiators explained that the oﬀer was fairly
close to their “bottom line.” Meanwhile, Maine governor James Longley
complained that the negotiators had treated state leaders “shabbily” by
not including them in the process. Some state legislators wondered
aloud whether they should grab their guns to defend their lands or to
shoot the White House negotiators. In visiting Augusta, Muskie was
hoping to bridge the divide before it became any wider.1
He began by recalling his own ties to the Maine legislature and to
the Wabanaki tribes. When he had first arrived in Augusta as a new legislator from Waterville in 1947, he claimed that he had been seated next
to “the Indian Representative.” As he explained with some regret, he
never met this fellow legislator because “they did not have the vote and
they never attended sessions in those days, much as we would have welcomed them.” But Muskie did more than seek to revive legislators’ bygone sympathy for Indians. Far more important than emotional appeals
were facts. He presented them in person because “these points don’t always come through clearly in the press.” Equally important, he presented himself as a negotiator: “I am not here to sell a particular point of
view this morning. . . . I am here to try to explain as best I can, and I may
not be the most eﬀective spokesman to do it, exactly what is at stake and
what the choices are.”
e forty-minute explanation that followed would seem to put to
rest one basic question. Did the “S” of Muskie’s middle initial stand not
just for “Sixtus” but also for “Silent”? In short, no, but for all he said,
Muskie’s role in the history of this momentous dispute remains elusive.
is fact is doubly remarkable. First, Muskie himself was a man of immense political stature—his involvement in the land claims would be
sandwiched by his 1972 campaign for President and his 1980 appointment as Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of State. Second, the Land Claims
themselves constituted, in the retrospective words of one reporter for
the Bangor Daily News, “the biggest story in Maine in the late 1970s.”2
Indeed, Muskie apparently considered it the single most complicated issue in Maine’s history as a state.3 And the issue had resonances far west
of Downeast. State and indigenous leaders along the eastern seaboard
watched Maine closely for what could be a precedent for their own land
disputes over long-neglected treaties.
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So what do we learn from an examination of Maine’s biggest politician during Maine’s biggest political drama? Most immediately, it provides new insight into a man about whom we know remarkably little.4
Muskie’s unwavering commitment to a negotiated settlement was
rooted in bedrock principles, but also in a notable, if unsurprising, ignorance of the Wabanakis who spurred the dispute. While the former
quality made him distinctive among Maine politicians, the latter did
not. Both elements shaped his speech to the Legislature. His insistence
on negotiation was the centerpiece of the speech. His ignorance of Wabanakis appeared in his brief sympathetic comments about the “Indian
Representative’s” absence: contrary to what Muskie remembered, no
Wabanaki could have been seated near him, and none were welcome
because they had been forbidden membership in 1941.5 But Muskie’s
statements teach us about more than the strengths and limits of his own
position. ey enable us to understand a little better why the controversy unfolded in the halting way that it did; we see why it was, for instance, that Muskie’s speech of February 1978 marked only an intermediate stage rather than a conclusion to the dispute.6 More broadly still, a
study of Muskie’s involvement reminds us that these events were very
much a part of the stream of events that defined the 1970s, a decade
that, like the politician and the dispute, seems to have gained little credibility among historians.7 Last of all, Muskie’s involvement sheds some
light on the ambiguous legacies of Maine Indian Land Claims.
To understand Muskie’s role requires first a survey of Maine Indian
history.8 Prior to the 1970s, the Mi’kmaqs, Maliseets, Penobscots, and
Passamaquoddies, who are known collectively as “Wabanakis,” or “People of the Dawnland,” were the responsibility of the state oﬃcials. Not
long aer independence, Massachusetts acquired land from Penobscots
and Passamaquoddies in a series of treaties first signed in 1794. Aer
1820 the new state of Maine assumed responsibility for negotiating
these land sales. A state-appointed Indian agent controlled Penobscot
and Passamaquoddy finances, and Wabanakis could not vote in any
election before 1955. Despite having their own reservation lands and independent political organizations, Maine’s two largest tribes struggled
to retain control over their resources and lifeways. Mi’kmaqs and
Maliseets, who lived mostly in Aroostook County but whose principal
populations were in Quebec, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, were
simply ignored as tribal entities.9
For 130 years state policymakers, much like their counterparts in
Washington, D.C., expected Indians to assimilate gradually into the
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larger white society. In the 1940s, the legislature became more aggressive in its eﬀort to eliminate the tribes. In 1941, it revoked the centuryold rights of Passamaquoddy and Penobscot tribal representatives to be
seated with and speak to the legislature. (It was this ban that Muskie
overlooked in his somewhat rose-tinted recollections in 1978.) By 1952
some state oﬃcials proposed abolishing, or terminating, the tribes and
their reservations altogether. is, too, paralleled larger national policies
towards Indians, in fact foreshadowing the Congressional Resolution
from 1953 that sought “to make the Indians within the territorial limits
of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the
United States.”10 Muskie, who was a state legislator from 1947 to 1955
and governor from 1955 to 1959, supported this termination eﬀort. As
governor, he echoed the widely held belief that the state should “help
the Indians achieve responsible self-government and self-determination
on the same basis as other Maine communities.” Wabanakis were much
less enthusiastic about this new eﬀort to “help” them. In a letter to state
oﬃcials, Penobscots criticized the attempt to undermine “their nation as
a free nation, their people as a free people.” ough their representatives
could not speak on the legislature’s floor, numerous Passamaquoddies
and Penobscots testified against termination. Far from being silenced,
the tribes successfully thwarted Maine’s eﬀorts to disband them.11
Maine’s two biggest tribes carried this political momentum into the
coming decade; in 1965 they successfully lobbied for a state Department
of Indian Aﬀairs, which recognized the tribes’ independence and persistence.12
Meanwhile, Passamaquoddies became increasingly insistent on defending their land base. A non-Indian developer who claimed to own
lands within the bounds of the nation sparked a series of protests in
1964. Basing their claims on a copy of the 1796 treaty, Passamaquoddies
sought not only the return of the developer’s parcel but also another
6,000 acres occupied by non-Indians.13 So began a conflict that would
directly challenge Maine’s traditional claims of authority and would catapult Wabanakis into the center of the Red Power Movement, a national
campaign for Indian rights. In 1971, a newly minted lawyer, Tom
Tureen, realized that the Passamaquoddies had grounds to sue for far
more than the 6,000 acres that they had lost since 1796. e 1796 treaty
and Passamaquoddies’ subsequent treaties with Massachusetts and
Maine were in fact void. Although both states had long claimed control
over the tribes within their borders, their land purchases had in fact vio-
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“Maine Indian Land Claim: Justice Department Litigation Recommendation,
2/28/77.” Shortly aer President Carter took oﬃce, Justice Department oﬃcials
used Attorney Tom Tureen’s claims to identify five “areas” that could be subject
to litigation. Original map courtesy of Special Collections, Raymond H. Fogler
Library, University of Maine, Orono, Maine. Map from Folder 6, Box 6, Series
3.3.13.2, William S. Cohen Papers.
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lated a federal law from 1790 that required the United States Congress
to ratify all treaties and land sales with Indians. Tureen was essentially
calling into question the state’s and private landowners’ title to all lands
held by the Passamaquoddy in 1790. When Penobscots joined the suit
in early 1972, the two tribes essentially contested the ownership of
roughly the northern two thirds of the state.14 Despite his guarded excitement about the legal possibilities, Tureen soon realized that he had
made his discovery only months before a federal statute of limitations
on Indian land suits was due to expire in 1972. Governor Kenneth Curtis urged Congressional leaders to amend the statute because “the Indians deserve their Day in Court.”15 In the end, no such legislative adjustment was necessary because Tureen managed to file the suit before the
deadline, but at the least the governor had expressed support for airing
the question, if not actually giving the Wabanakis their land. e resultant federal ruling by Judge Edward Gignoux in Passamaquoddy v. Morton (1975) favored the tribes, immediately granting federal status to the
Penobscots and Passamaquoddies.16 No longer wards of the State of
Maine, they would be subject only to federal authority. Gignoux further
required the United States to begin procedures for suing Maine and private landholders for the return of lands acquired in violation of the
Non-intercourse Act of 1790. Indian and non-Indian Mainers were facing a massive struggle over the fate of the state.17
Gignoux made his ruling in the last year of Muskie’s third term as
U.S. Senator. Maine’s most senior Congressional legislator had little
early involvement in the case, largely because Congress did not need to
be involved but also because he had done little related to Indian aﬀairs
during his political career. Muskie’s ideas on Indian policy tended to
follow national trends. As governor, he had supported termination in
the 1950s, but as the nation’s sentiment changed, so did his. When, in
1970, Nixon called for an end to federal eﬀorts to terminate Indian nations and asserted that “self-determination among Indian people can
and must be encouraged without the threat of eventual termination,”
Senator Muskie sounded much the same. As he observed, the federal
government’s failure to consult with Indians on Indian policy “has been
one of our greatest faults in the past.”18
Such sentiments became more prominent as he began to consider a
presidential run in 1971. He and his staﬀers recognized the importance
of appealing to increasingly vocal Native American activists and their
supporters. at spring he announced his co-sponsorship of legislation
to have federal aid apply to state tribes, including those in eastern
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states.19 And he highlighted this bill when he reassured one inquiring
Native woman from California who wanted to know “what will you do
for [American Indians], how do you feel about them,?? [sic]”20 He elaborated on his sentiments in a long letter to the administrative assistant
of Governor James Exon of Nebraska, who was himself planning to support Muskie’s presidential bid:
e federal government must commit itself to fulfill its promises,
treaty or informal, to Indian tribes. If the tribes no longer have to fear the
vagaries of past federal policies, and if self-determination is no longer
used as a camouflage for terminating federal obligations, we will have
provided a better framework for Indians to work to run their own aﬀairs,
and eventually replace, by a process of natural evolution, the gigantic bureaucratic machinery by which Indian initiative is now stifled.21

e private rhetoric inspired confidence, but, as his California correspondent’s questions implied, his public actions were not so emphatic. As one Muskie staﬀer acknowledged in March 1972, shortly before Muskie’s presidential hopes collapsed, the Senator’s “record on
Indian matters shows a history of ‘right’ votes, but no policy initiative.”
As a result, Muskie “is therefore viewed with disfavor in the Indian
community generally.”22
In some respects, these positions fit Muskie’s unwillingness to
grandstand on controversial issues. As one sympathetic biographer
noted in the year of his presidential bid, Muskie was “a pragmatist and a
compromiser and believes that is how government goes forward.”23 His
skill at passing complex environmental and budgetary legislation justified his renown as one of the masters of compromise in the Senate. is
desire for compromise was itself rooted in his political moderation and
his belief that an authoritative understanding of complex subjects conferred the expertise and the influence necessary to find common
ground.24 Muskie had become a Democratic governor and U.S. Senator
in a traditionally Republican state thanks to his ability to chart a middle
path and bridge political divides. For instance, his opposition to the
Vietnam War appeared later than that of many other Democratic colleagues.25 So when Muskie echoed Governor Curtis’s plea to extend the
statute of limitations on the Passamaquoddies’ suit in 1972, he spoke
not of justice for Indians but of an opportunity “to resolve questions
which have been a cause of contention between the Passamaquoddy Indians and the citizens of Maine for close to 150 years.”26 In this first direct intervention and in the work that followed, Muskie acted on ideas
that had guided his political career—his insistence on negotiation and
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his ignorance of Indians. Unlike Curtis, who had worked closely with
Wabanakis, he spoke not as an advocate for the tribes but as one who
hoped to appeal to both sides in the dispute.
Because the two sides he appealed to were very far apart, this apparently neutral position had significant consequences . On one side,
Penobscots and Passamaquoddies were pursuing a land claim of unprecedented scope and with an autonomy that the state had long denied
them. As tribal leaders explained to Longley, the stakes of the suit demanded that they seek land and not simply monetary compensation.
“Our obligation to our past generations, who have suﬀered such needless poverty and obscurity, and to our future generations, whose
prospects are so bright, leaves us no alternative.”27 Signs of Wabanakis’
identification with the wider Red Power movement appeared as well:
hanging on the side of the house of one Penobscot elder was a plywood
board painted with the words, “Wounded Knee.”28 More concretely, the
ruling in Passamaquoddy v. Morton had augmented both tribes’ political status by placing them under the sole jurisdiction of federal laws. After years of existing at the whim of Maine’s legislators and jurists, the
tribes could now act independently of them.
On the other side of the dispute, Governor James Longley opposed
negotiations that involved any transfer of land or recognition of Indians’ sovereignty outside of state authority. Some of his opposition was
fiscal. He had won the 1974 election to the governorship without party
backing or electoral experience largely by criticizing government expenditures, and he was not about to allow several thousand Mainers to obtain exemption from state taxes and regulation. He frequently presented
his positions with long diatribes employing inflammatory rhetoric.
Muskie himself complained of the governor’s apparent incapacity to listen to those who disagreed with him, and one Muskie staﬀer wondered
if the governor even wanted a settlement.29
Most of the other major players agreed with Longley, even if they
avoided his mercurial style. State Attorney General Joseph Brennan opposed any transfer of land in part because he believed that the state
could win the case in court. e state’s major newspapers opposed any
kind of settlement that included land, and most of their readers (and
Muskie’s constituents) shared this sentiment. Letters to Muskie from
people throughout Maine questioned why Indians deserved the return
of land that whites had improved through hard work and defended in
numerous wars. ey questioned why the government owed anything
to people who supposedly had received state handouts that, as one con-
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stituent explained, “paid many times over for any claims they may have
had to any land in Maine.”30 Although such letter writers frequently had
no idea that Wabanakis had participated in disproportionately high
rates in the same wars or that they had been supported not with state
welfare benefits but with the sale and lease of their reservation resources
(largely at the discretion of the state’s agents), Muskie must have realized that much of this hostility was rooted in more than ignorance. Recurring threats of violence against Indians, whether in the form of violence against Wabanaki children at mostly white schools or in the
resurgence of a chapter of the Ku Klux Klan near the Penobscots’ reservation on Indian Island, manifested Mainers’ anxiety over their property.31 From his position in Washington, Muskie must have recognized
the roots of this unease. On the one hand, Mainers were participating in
a broader national trend; claims to property rights and economic security were becoming increasingly prominent throughout the nation in
the 1970s, as opponents of busing and other civil rights reforms frequently claimed to be fighting an interventionist government obstructing their eﬀorts to pursue the American Dream.32 Newspaper reports
about the Land Claims were frequently sandwiched among stories about
high inflation, frustration with taxes, and a general sense of national
anxiety. On the other hand, the roots of this opposition were decidedly
local. As Andrew Akins, a Penobscot and chair of the PassamaquoddyPenobscot Negotiating Committee, pointedly noted, “Why, it was as if
we had touched a raw nerve… and unleashed all their deep hatred for
Indians, together with their guilt for what they had done to the Indians
over all the years.”33
e principal national figure who might have bridged this gap was,
himself, hamstrung by the complexity of the case and by his lack of familiarity with the principal players. Having successfully campaigned for
the presidency as an outsider who could reform Washington, D.C.,
Jimmy Carter was both sympathetic to the needs for mediation and unprepared for what it would require of him. At every stage, Carter preferred to entrust the diﬃcult task of finding a solution to others. Apparently, the presidential engagement that made possible the historic Camp
David accords between Israel and Egypt in September 1978 was not going to save Maine from its own conflict over land and history.34
More than any of the participants, Muskie was in a position to be
sensitive to the local complexities of the case and its national context.
His thoughts, though, were oen elsewhere. He had become a national
leader in environmental and budgetary policy, and his interest in for-
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eign policy was growing in the late 1970s.35 When he was involved in the
Land Claims, Muskie’s sympathies initially lay with the state and its
non-Indian inhabitants. In one early private meeting, he fretted that the
tribes would use the economic threat posed by a lawsuit to force the
state into an “inequitable” settlement, one that would fail to acknowledge that “there are only innocent parties today.”36 He also initially admitted that he was “frustrated” that the Penobscots and Passamaquoddies insisted on obtaining land when a monetary damage settlement
would be much easier to obtain and much less disruptive for the state.37
is frustration initially led Muskie in 1976 to co-sponsor legislation to
extinguish the claims by retroactively ratifying all land dealings with Indians in Maine since 1790.38 Had the law passed, Indians could have
sued for monetary compensation but nothing more. e move pleased
Longley and outraged Wabanakis, but the bill never made it out of the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Aﬀairs. Senator James Abourezk, a
Democrat from South Dakota who chaired the committee, lambasted
the proposal as a “very one-sided attempt to obviate and preclude any
just claim on the part of the tribes.”39
Despite his concerns about the potential ramifications of a settlement involving land, Muskie never again insisted on a purely monetary
resolution. Muskie understood the Senate well enough to know that any
legislation relating to Indian aﬀairs would depend on the support of
Abourezk and his committee. He was also following the lead of the
newly elected President Carter, who advocated for negotiations as a necessary alternative to the litigation that would leave Maine land titles in
legal limbo and could last a decade or more. Carter appointed a retired
Georgia Supreme Court Judge, William Gunter, to cra a solution. In
July 1977, Gunter proposed that the tribes receive $25 million, 100,000
acres of land, and the option to purchase another 400,000. In an eﬀort to
avoid messy negotiations over details, the judge demanded both sides
accept his proposal in its entirety or not at all. When both sides balked
for diﬀerent reasons, Carter abandoned Gunter’s proposals and assembled a new task force, which he called the Working Group, to examine
the problem. Muskie’s involvement in these initial negotiations and proposals during mid-1977 was limited, but his thinking was clear, and to
Longley’s consternation, dramatically diﬀerent from earlier in the year.
As Muskie explained in an interview shortly aer the release of Gunter’s
proposals in August, “My personal feeling is that given the deep convictions each side has in its case...and as a lawyer who hasn’t practiced in
some 30 years, this case seems one made to order for a settlement.” Lon-
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gley was dumbfounded by what he thought was a statement “contrary to
the position you have expressed to us,” but Muskie would not waver in
this assessment for the rest of the dispute.40 However, he maintained a
low profile. Some of this relative silence probably derived from an unwillingness to upstage Justice Gunter, the Working Group, or a fellow
Democrat in the White House, but partly it was also likely a lack of interest. He made no mention of the controversy in his review of the year
for the Lewiston Sun in January 1978.41
He would break this silence two weeks later, shortly aer Carter’s
Working Group and the tribal negotiators released their Joint Memorandum of Understanding. It proposed that the tribes receive $25 million from Washington and $25.5 million from the state. In exchange,
the tribes would drop all suits against properties of less than 50,000
acres but would be able to purchase up to 300,000 acres from large landholders at $5 per acre, well below the estimated value of $100 per acre
for northern forestland. If the state or the landowners failed to respond
to the proposals within sixty days, the U. S. Attorney General would initiate the lawsuit against the state and all landowners.
It was one week aer the release of the proposals that Muskie spoke
before the state legislature. During the speech, he laid out the basic principles that would guide his subsequent participation in the Land Claims
dispute. He refused to endorse the plan, saying only that the large
landowners and the state had the right to accept, reject, or renegotiate
the proposals. He did highlight, however, the benefits of negotiation, as
litigation might result in greater sacrifices for the state and its private
landowners. In some respects, Muskie did not consider himself qualified to oﬀer a more explicit opinion. “I regard myself,” he concluded,
“the instrument of the people of this state, and I am not going to try to
force my views on them.” Besides, he noted, if anyone should be the
spokesperson for Mainers, it should be the governor.42 He returned regularly to this insistence that negotiation under the governor’s leadership
was best for the state. As he explained at the end of March with characteristic bluntness, “I don’t have any new proposal to make and if I did I
wouldn’t make it, as any proposal a politician would make would be the
next target, as President Carter found out.”43 Like Muskie, Carter also
refused to endorse any particular plan, but he was a little clearer about
the dangers of involvement. Speaking to a town hall meeting in Bangor
in February, Carter acknowledged, “politically, there’s no advantage in
trying to resolve a question of this kind.”44
By promoting negotiation, Muskie sought to encourage a resolution



Maine History

without getting caught between an aggrieved minority and a hostile majority. is insistence on negotiation was most apparent during the uncertain months of mid-1978, when the fate of the state seemed suspended between the unpopular Working Group proposal and the
uncertain future of litigation. Muskie’s commitment to dialogue was
unusual among state politicians. Longley wondered if the Working
Group, in proposing that large landowners sell land below market value,
had forgotten that they were not in the Soviet Union or communist
China. State Attorney General Brennan simply rejected the recommendations, confident that the state would “prevail in litigation.” Republican Congressman William Cohen, whose Second Congressional District included most of the disputed lands, called the proposal “arbitrary”
and “confiscatory.” As the sixty-day deadline for a state response approached and a federal suit loomed at the end of May, Muskie was still
insisting that negotiation was preferable to a protracted legal battle.
Some Longley staﬀers thought he was “the only person” who could
“force continued negotiations.” And he was not afraid to unleash his famous temper to insist on them. When Longley approached him privately some time during the tense days of late May and early June to
seek Muskie’s support for a bill that would allow monetary but not territorial compensation, a bill that would eﬀectively kill any Wabanaki desire to negotiate, Muskie did not conceal his frustration. As staﬀer Estelle Lavoie recalled years later, the senator’s emphatic and infuriated
reply could be heard through two sets of oﬃce doors.45
It was not for lack of ideas that he maintained this unwavering
stance. As he explained to Don Larrabee, Longley’s liaison in Washington, some kind of oﬀer of land, perhaps in the range of 100,000 acres,
plus a combination of state and federal funds, should provide “a basis
for talks if all the parties regarded these items as negotiable.”46 And, as
far as he was concerned, the governor’s obstinacy was the biggest obstacle to negotiating these terms. It certainly could not be the Penobscots
and Passamaquoddies. “ere are 4,000 Indians at the most,” he explained to Larrabee; “they surely must realize the whole state is against
them. If they had the feeling that the other parties were willing to give,
they would give also.”47
And it was in this simple mathematical acknowledgement, that four
thousand Wabanakis were fighting one million non-Indians, that
Muskie revealed a second element of his strategy to handle the Land
Claims. Pragmatism as well as principle guided his desire to present
himself as a neutral arbiter. As he and Carter both acknowledged, a
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politician had little to gain from getting involved in such a dispute. e
dangers of that involvement and even negotiation itself became even
more apparent in early August, when Attorney General Griﬃn Bell announced that the Department of Justice would not pursue claims
against any private landowners. e dramatic departure from Carter’s
stated intention to sue in the event that negotiations collapsed placed
the entire process in jeopardy. Longley saw this change in fortunes as
his opportunity to press the Maine Congressional delegation to cra a
resolution, but when he invited, urged, and finally publicly demanded
that Muskie “come up with your own plan and see if you can get the delegation to unite” around a proposal, Muskie refused to respond.48 Instead, some members of his staﬀ insisted he should let his junior colleague William Hathaway “take the initiative.” Chief of staﬀ Leon
Billings further counseled Muskie that only when Hathaway did not
demonstrate interest, “you should act.”49
Such action would not be necessary. Hathaway, facing a tough reelection campaign against Representative Cohen, felt compelled by politics and personal conviction to rise to the challenge.50 He had already
earned the ire of many Mainers for supporting the Working Group proposal as “a reasonable settlement.”51 Cohen regularly reminded Mainers
about this unpopular stance. A flyer mailed by the Cohen campaign
compared the two candidates on a number of issues, but fully half of its
space compared Hathaway’s support for the original Working Group
proposal with Cohen’s criticism that the proposal was “fundamentally
flawed.” It concluded, simply, “Bill Cohen: A Senator For Maine.”52
Sensitive to such attacks, Hathaway held a series of meetings with the
major landowners and state oﬃcials. In late October he introduced a
new basis for a settlement: the federal government would appropriate
$37 million to purchase 100,000 acres at fair market value, and the tribal
territories in the state would have the same status and independence as
other municipalities. State leaders praised the new plan to use federal
money to pay full value for timberlands, and Indians expressed cautious
preliminary interest.
Muskie, who had never shared Hathaway’s strong support of the
Penobscots’ and Passamaquoddies’ claims, oﬀered tepid support for his
colleague.53 In a press release, he congratulated his junior colleague and
anticipated that “it shouldn’t take long at all in the new Congress to get
this nailed down into law.” Such mild words did little to counter Cohen
and Longley, who attacked Hathaway for taking too much credit for negotiations that they had either opposed or ignored. Despite Hathaway’s
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diplomatic heroics, on Election Day, Cohen prevailed by a margin of
nearly two to one.54 Whether Muskie could have changed this outcome
is hard to say, considering Mainers’ hostility towards Wabanakis. Indeed, Attorney General “Indian Fighter Joe” Brennan capitalized on this
anti-Wabanaki sentiment to win the governor’s seat with promises of
“not one inch and not one dollar” to Maine’s Indians.55 Clearly, most
Mainers were against Wabanakis, but it was still with some bitterness
that Hathaway recalled years later, “Ed should have supported me more
than he did.”56
Should he? Hathaway had good reason to question Muskie’s restrained handling of the Land Claims, but Muskie’s strategy essentially
reflected three basic influences on his thinking, influences we have already encountered. First, it was true, as a staﬀer had recognized in 1972,
that Muskie considered it important to make “right votes” on Indian issues, and while we do not know how he voted on several pieces of legislation, including the Indian Child Welfare Act and the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, which were both passed in 1978, we do know
that he thought very highly of their sponsor and his old critic, Senator
Abourezk of South Dakota. When Abourezk announced that he would
not seek a second term as Senator, Muskie praised how he “always
spoke for those least able to speak for themselves in the corridors of
power,” including “the Indians whose love and respect he enjoys and
has so well earned.”57 Such statements would understandably lead
Hathaway to expect more from his senior colleague.
Convictions mattered, but so did a second consideration. Muskie
refused to let advocacy interfere with the more important need for negotiation and compromise in any proposal. He suggested as much when
he speculated that his friend and colleague Abourezk might be leaving
the Senate so soon because “the same energy, imagination, and deep
sense of justice which made him so valuable to us made the frustration
with the legislative process, which we all chafe under, unbearable to
[him].”58 As he explained to one reporter two years earlier, on any complex dispute, “you’ve got to have consensus.”59 And in this dispute, categorical pronouncements could undermine such a quest. However much
Muskie supported Hathaway’s ideas (and it is not clear how much he
did), he believed he could not stand unequivocably behind any proposal
that would itself require negotiation and, potentially, modification.
A third quality, the personal attribute Muskie most valued, perhaps
decisively shaped his restrained response to Hathaway’s plan. As he had
made clear in his shepherding of complex environmental legislation,
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and as he explained to anyone willing to listen, there was one route to
influence as a legislator. “If you’ve done your homework and know what
you’re talking about, that is power.”60 When it came to the Land Claims,
the limited extent of his knowledge appeared in a surprisingly awkward
way. One night at a private dinner during the intense weeks prior to
Election Day, 1978, one guest, Cynthia Beliveau, found herself on opposite sides of Muskie during a discussion of the Land Claims. Years later,
she recalled his formidable debating skill and the intensity with which
he pressed his argument. Uncertain how to respond, she cut to the
point: “And I sort of challenged him a little bit, it was kind of like, well,
you know, you’re not an Indian, . . . how do you know how they feel
about X, Y, Z or. And he was very perturbed at me for sort of saying this
among, you know, and everybody stopped to listen.” Despite a mutual
friend’s eﬀorts to smooth the conversation over, Muskie became “furious.” As Beliveau remembered it, “he got up and stormed away from the
table.”61 For a man who preferred to be an expert, the Land Claims presented a set of challenges that, as Beliveau accidentally discovered, lay
uncomfortably outside his expertise. In wishing for a more ardent and
eﬀective supporter, it seems, Hathaway was expecting Muskie to be
somebody he was not.
Following Hathaway’s defeat, Carter and Muskie both took a less
prominent role in the search for a settlement. Cohen’s victory seemed to
consign Hathaway’s plan to political limbo. Part of the problem
stemmed from increasing Wabanaki discontent over the land they were
to acquire. Before agreeing to the new proposal, some wanted to determine first which lands were available for purchase. Meanwhile, other
Wabanakis insisted that the tribes were entitled to the 300,000 acres that
the Working Group had initially proposed.62 Questions of sovereignty
also complicated the negotiations. Although Passamaquoddy Chief
John Stevens expressed a willingness to accommodate Longley’s demands for state jurisdiction over the tribes, Penobscot Tribal Representative Tim Love claimed that the United States Constitution itself protected Maine Indians’ status as outside state law.63 To complicate
matters further, the Mi’kmaqs and the Maliseets of Aroostook County
were seeking inclusion in the provisions of any land claims settlement.64
Muskie kept abreast of these developments, but as he explained to a
constituent curious about his position on the Hathaway plan, he was not
involved in the negotiations and was awaiting an agreement to submit
to the Senate.65 Even as he waited, though, he did not welcome the news
of the new complications in the Wabanakis’ position. A staﬀ member
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meeting with the Mi’kmaqs and Maliseets warned them in June that
their eﬀorts to be included in the claim “would not make matters easier.”66 Muskie himself was frustrated that the Hathaway plan’s oﬀer of
100,000 acres was no longer operative.67 But even in his frustration, he
still said little about a plan that he had barely endorsed.
Eventually, it would be Senator William Cohen and state Attorney
General Richard Cohen who would lead the last negotiations toward a
settlement. ough the two men were not related, they shared a common interest in resolving the dispute. Where Senator Cohen recognized
that the 300,000 acres meant higher financial costs, these costs were
much less than the prospect of continuing deadlock or long-term litigation. Attorney General Cohen, for his part, recognized the importance
of compromise on questions of jurisdiction, and while he did insist on
preserving the state’s regulatory authority over most matters, he also
conceded that the tribes should be eligible for federal programs through
the Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs. By the first months of 1980, the basic contours were set. Indians would receive $81.5 million, $27 million of
which would be set up in trust funds for annuities. e remaining $54.5
million would allow Penobscots and Passamaquoddies to purchase up
to 300,000 acres of land. Maliseets, having demonstrated a historic presence within the state, would be able to use $900,000 of the settlement
money to purchase land. Mi’kmaqs were not included in the settlement
because they had yet not assembled adequate historical evidence to
prove their long-term residence in Maine. A number of legal ambiguities remained unresolved, for even as the state negotiators celebrated
provisions that would restore state jurisdiction over tribal lands, tribal
leaders believed that they had not abandoned the sovereignty that their
courtroom victory had aﬃrmed in 1975. e state law that implemented
the provisions of the agreement included the creation of a Maine Indian
Tribal-State Commission, whose members from state and tribal governments would work out points of dispute or misunderstanding. e
agreement required ratification by the tribes as well as state legislation
and federal legislation to authorize the necessary funds.68
ough he now possessed the legislation he had awaited for over
two years, Muskie remained quite restrained. At a press conference with
other members of the Maine Congressional delegation held on March
19, several days aer the announced settlement, Muskie was explicitly
non-committal except to note, as Chair of the Senate Budget Committee, that the new settlement had a larger price tag than previous ones.69
In fact, it was more than double the cost of the settlement Hathaway had
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brokered. Such a sharp increase would not sit well with a President who
was seeking deep budget cuts to control rising deficits and an inflation
rate of 11.3%.70 Perhaps, as Tom Tureen later suspected, Muskie was
seeking to appear fiscally conservative at a time when he was mulling
another presidential bid. Perhaps he was being the cautious legislator
that he had been for the previous two years. Regardless, the tribes’ principal lawyer felt “betrayed” by Muskie’s sudden reticence.71
As it turned out, Muskie did not to have to face these knotty financial questions because Carter appointed him Secretary of State in May.
Governor Brennan appointed George Mitchell to complete Muskie’s
term, and together Mitchell and Cohen shepherded the necessary bills
through Congress and to Carter’s desk for signing in October and December. When Carter conducted an October signing ceremony, eagle
feather quill in hand, Muskie was there, smiling as broadly as any of the
other Wabanaki and state negotiators who had helped make the settlement possible.
He had good reason to smile. is moment of resolution vindicated
his longstanding insistence on negotiation. And in that insistence,
Muskie had revealed a little about himself and his time. Most obviously,
he had acted out of principle. As he made clear to the Maine State Legislature on that snowy and uneasy morning in February 1978, all sides—
state, tribes, and landowners—would do well to engage in discussions
that would avoid the long, costly, and far less certain outcomes of litigation. As Longley would discover, Muskie insisted on this principle to the
point of outrage. By presenting himself as an advocate for a process
rather than a champion of a particular outcome, Muskie could also remain true to his understanding that as a U.S. Senator, his real work
would begin only aer state and tribal leaders brought some kind of accord to the Capitol.
But to the dismay of Hathaway in 1978 and Tureen in 1980, when
people did approach him with something looking like a resolution,
Muskie became surprisingly evasive. Apparently, he did not seem prepared to endorse the outcomes of the negotiations he demanded. Why?
For one, pragmatism as well as principles motivated Muskie’s thinking.
As he noted at various points, a politician had little to gain from direct
involvement in a dispute between four thousand Indians and one million non-Indians. More pointedly, as political commentator John Day
noted in the spring of 1980, the largely anti-Wabanaki political rhetoric
of the previous two years had taken a toll: “You only have to remember
what happened to Hathaway [in 1978] to understand why nobody is
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Carter signing Indian land dispute bill, October 10, 1980, © Bettmann/Corbis.
Standing immediately behind Carter, le to right, are Maine Governor Joseph
Brennan, U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, U.S. Senator George Mitchell,
and Maliseet Chief Terrence Polchies. On the far right, behind Chief Polchies, is
Reuben “Butch” Phillips, Penobscot member of the negotiating team.

fighting to pick up the Indians’ football and run with it.” Day noted, too,
that Muskie, as chair of the Budget Committee, was going to have a
tough sell if he was going to convince his colleagues to approve $80 million for his own state when he had trimmed or eliminated their own legislative projects.72
In a sense, what Day reminds us is that Muskie was a man of his
moment. His smile, in a sense, expressed not just his pleasure at the
ways that he had remained true to his personal convictions and political
calculations but also his relief that he had done so within a complex political landscape. More than Tureen and perhaps more than Hathaway,
Muskie positioned himself not just in terms of Maine’s politics but also
in terms of an increasingly circumscribed national political landscape.
He was acutely aware that the inflation-burdened, post-Vietnam United
States did not have the abundant resources it had a decade or two earlier. Whether or not presidential ambitions complicated his thinking,
Muskie knew that as the nation’s economic capacity was shrinking, so
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too was its political climate shiing. Public opposition was growing
against activist government and the taxes that supported it. Conservative whites were launching successful critiques of civil rights and Native
sovereignty. How much these factors drove Muskie’s unwillingness to
speak out for a settlement is diﬃcult to say, but considering the financial
focus of his comments in March 1980, national developments must
have had some impact on a Senator who knew that he would need to
convince the nation’s legislators to accept such a settlement.
Muskie was also a man of his time in another sense. Like most nonIndians, he knew very little about Wabanakis or Native Americans generally. To his credit, he had helped cra legislation in the early 1970s to
address rampant poverty in Wabanaki and other eastern Native American communities. But concern did not always translate into comprehension. It is noteworthy that of the two known instances where Muskie
did lose his composure over the Land Claims, one was when he was
confronted over his acquaintance with Wabanakis. To point this out is
not to distinguish Muskie. It reminds us, though, that Muskie, even for
all he did to remain abreast of developments, did not amass the expertise that made him such an influential player in other political disputes.
ese limits on Muskie’s engagement with the Land Claims, limits of
principle and pragmatism but also basic knowledge, encouraged him to
avoid the challenges that buﬀeted Hathaway without forsaking an image
of having “right” votes on issues relating to Native Americans. us, he
had good cause indeed for pleasure and relief in October 1980.
And in his commitment to limited engagement and in his relief over
its happy results, Muskie le a legacy far greater than his own involvement in the case would suggest. Muskie pressed for negotiation, but he
le Longley and Brennan to articulate most loudly how representatives
of the state understood their relationship to the tribes. And the dismissive bombast of the former and the unrepentantly aggressive “Indian
fighting” rhetoric of the latter only validated many Mainers’ more violent fantasies for resolving a dispute they deeply feared. e power of
this rancor and the limits of negotiation would become more apparent
only with time. Many of the finer points of the settlement were le in
the hands of a newly created Maine Indian Tribal-State Commission.
e panel, with representatives from Maine state government as well as
the Penobscots, Passamaquoddies, Maliseets, and, aer 1991, Mi’kmaqs,
was charged with working out the limits of tribal sovereignty, particularly in terms of the tribes’ regulatory power over fishing and hunting
on tribal territory. Underfunded, largely ignored by the state, and
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deeply divided internally, the commission was, by the middle 1990s, “at
loggerheads.”73 e state task force that reached this conclusion also
proposed some modifications that enabled the commission to become a
more eﬀective forum for tribal-state relations. Many tribal leaders regret
the 1980 settlement, lamenting that the state’s insistence on treating
them like municipalities rather than sovereign nations has undermined
anything that money or land has provided. ere have been notable
achievements, not least the revitalization of Wabanaki communities and
cultural pride, but it is hard to celebrate these accomplishments without
recognizing a quiet bitterness, an abiding ambivalence.74
Muskie’s own participation provides an important window on this
ambivalence. He was obviously not the leader who spearheaded the reformist struggle known as the Land Claims dispute. at role belongs to
the Penobscots and Passamaquoddies, whose story is only now beginning to receive the careful attention it has long deserved.75 In his role as
a secondary player, though, we see once again how someone of high
stature, by taking a lower profile, could also shape a conflict. His calls
for negotiation framed the debate—indeed, one might say they helped
make it possible—but his silence within that debate also had an impact
on the tenor of state leaders’ rhetoric. His ambiguous position reflects
the ambiguities of the eventual settlement and its contested legacies.
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